Continental Casualty Co. v. Phoenix Constr. Co. [DISSENT] by Carter, Jesse W.
Golden Gate University School of Law
GGU Law Digital Commons
Jesse Carter Opinions The Jesse Carter Collection
5-4-1956
Continental Casualty Co. v. Phoenix Constr. Co.
[DISSENT]
Jesse W. Carter
Supreme Court of California
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions
Part of the Insurance Law Commons
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Jesse Carter Collection at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Jesse Carter Opinions by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carter, Jesse W., "Continental Casualty Co. v. Phoenix Constr. Co. [DISSENT]" (1956). Jesse Carter Opinions. Paper 151.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions/151
CoNTINENTAL CAs. Co. v. PHOENIX CoNSTR. Co. 423 
[46 C.2d 423; 296 P.2d 8011 
determine 
therefore annul the order. 
concurred. 
the com-
was denied 
the that the 
A. No. 23225. In Bank. May 4, 
CASUAI/rY COMPANY Corporation), 
v. PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 
Corporation) et al., Defendants and Hespondents; 
UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD'S, LONDON (an Un-
Assoeia tion) et al., Interveners and Re-
Master and Servant-Liability to Third Persons-Right of 
Recoupment.-\Vhere a judgment has been rendered against 
employer for damages occasioned by the unauthorized negli-
act of his employe, the employer may recoup his loss 
action against the negligent employe; as between em-
and employe in such a situation, the obligation of the 
is primary and that of the employer secondary. 
(Disapproving any contrary implie11tion~ in Co11solirluterl 
pers v. Pacific E. Ins. Co., 45 Cnl.App.2d 288, 293, 114 P.2d 
; Ai1· etc. Co. v. Employers' Liab. etc. Corp., 91 Cal.App.2d 
132, 204 P.2d 647; Employe1·s etc. Co1·p. v. Pacific etc. Ins. 
102 Cal.App.2d 188, 192, 227 P.2d 5:3; and Trodrrs etc. 
Co. v. Pacific Emp. Ins. Co., 130 Cnl.App.2d 158, ] 65-166, 
P.2Cl 4!B.) 
See Cal.Jur., Master and Servant, § 68; Am.Jur., Master ana 
§ 101. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Master and Servant, § 209; [2] 
§ 233; [3] Insurance, § 301; [4, 12] Insurance, § 60; 
§67; [6] Contracts, §140; [7] Insurance, §140; 
~ 161; [9] Automobiles,§ 4; [10] Automobiles,§ 68; 
~ 62; [13] Automobiles,§§ 68-1, 68-10; [14] Auto-
§ 68-1; [15] Appeal and Error, § 1230 (2) ; [16] Appeal 
§ 1429. 
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[2] Insurance--Subrogation.-Under equitable principles of subro-
the insurer of an employer who has been compelled to 
pay a judgment against the employer for damages occasioned 
the unauthorized negligent act of his employe may recover 
the negligent employe or the employe's insurer. 
[3] !d.-Questions of Law and Fact-Construction of Contract.-
Construction of insurance policies and excess certificates is a 
matter of law where they were introduced into evidence by 
were not subject to conflicting inferences, and no 
evidence was offered in aid of construction . 
• {4a, 4b] !d.-Interpretation of Contract-Against Insurer.-Any 
or uncertainty in an insurance policy must be 
resolved against the insurer. 
?(5] !d.-Interpretation of Contract-Endorsements.-If there is a 
conflict in meaning between an endorsement and the body of an 
insurance policy, the endorsement controls. 
[6] Contracts-Interpretation-Written and Printed Matter.-
Under Civ. Code, § 1651, the written or specially prepared 
portions of a contract control over those which are printed or 
taken from a form. 
/[7] Insurance - Interpretation of Contract- Endorsements. -
Where a highway construction company and a trucking com-
pany as joint venturers contracted with the state to do 
highway construction work and typewritten endorsements 
attached to a printed insurance policy issued to the highway 
construction company added the trucking company as an 
additional insured in connection with construction operations 
conducted as a joint venture but provided that the policy 
excluded coverage for all operations of the trucking company 
other than construction operations conducted as a joint venture 
and that the policy did not apply to automobiles owned, main-
tained or used by the trucking company even though used in a 
joint venture operation, the policy provided no coverage to an 
employe of the trucking company for an accident to a third 
person which resulted from the employe's negligent operation 
of a truck owned by the trucking company. 
/[8] !d.-Risks-Right of Insurer to Select.-An insurance com-
pany has the right to limit the coverage of a policy issued by 
it and, when it has done so, the plain language of the limitation 
must be respected. 
[9] Automobiles-Statutes-Construction.-The gt>ncral automo-
bile financial responsibility law (Veh. Code, §§ 410-423.1) is 
remedial in nature and in thf~ publie intPrcst is to be liberally 
construed to the end of fostering its objectives. 
See Cal.Jur.2d, In~nrance, § 1!12; Am.Jur., Insurance, § 166 
et seq. 
425 
of Contract-With Reference to 
pPnnissible, an insunwe:e contract 
such construction as will fairly achieve its object 
indemnity to the insured for the lossl·s to which 
!d.-Interpretation of Contract-Against Insurer.-lf an m-
uses language whieh is unc('rtain any reasonable doubt 
be resolved against it; if the doubt relates to extent or 
uf coverage, whether as to peril insured against, the 
of liability, or the persun or persons proteeted, the 
will be understood in its most inclusive sense, for 
insured's benefit. 
Automobiles-Insurance-Persons and Claims Covered. 
Code, s 416 (a part of the general automobile financial 
law), declaring that a motor vehicle liability 
"shall insure the person named therein and any other 
or responsible for the use of said motor vehiele 
with the . , , permission of said assured," coupled with 
of the Highway Carriers Act (Stats. 1935, ch. 223) 
language of a policy issued to a trucking company 
the driver of a vehicle as to his duties on the 
of an accident and declaring that the coverage 
"shall comply with the provisions of the motor 
financial responsibility law ... which shall be appli-
with respect to any such liability out of the 
... or nse of any automobile ... to the extent 
coverage and limits of liability required by such law," 
properly be construed to mean minimum coverage or 
limits, but must be interpreted as providing full or 
coverage in both aspects insofar as encompassed 
law and not exceeding the clear limitations of the 
Id.~Insurance-Persons Insured.-Under a motor vehicle lia-
policy issued to a trucking company that the 
"insured" includes the named insured and also "any 
[ of motor vehiele finaneial responsibility aet, note, 
3G A.L.R.2d J 011 . 
additional evidence in a 
C.2d 
director or 
the scope of his duties 
includes an employe 
had the company's truck under 
it and was acting 
;yw"ctcwu for leave to pro-
court will be denied 
where no useful purpose would be served in 
evidence. 
such 
!d.-Reversal With Directions.-Where there are no factual 
issues to be determined after a reversal of a judgment, and 
where the errors of the trial court were of law only, it is 
to reverse with directions. (Code Civ. Proc., § 53.) 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Jesse J. Frampton, Judge. Reversed with 
directions. 
Action for declaratory relief. Judgment fixing liabilities 
of insurers, reversed with directions; application to produce 
additional evidence, denied. 
Jennings & Belcher, Sigurd E. Murphy and Louis E. 
Kearney for Appellant. 
Robert W. Stevenson, ,John F. O'Hara, Martin, Hahn & 
Camusi, "William P. Camusi and Oscar F. Catalano for Re-
spondents and Interveners. 
Bledsoe, Smith, Cathcart, Johnson & Phelps, Early, Mas-
lach, Foran & Williams as Amici Curiae on behalf of Re-
spondents. 
SCHAUEH, J.-In this suit for declaratory relief determi-
nation is sought, as among the contesting insurance com-
panies, of the order of incidence and of the limits of their 
contractual obligations to defendants Phoenix Con-
struction Company, Oilfields Trucking Company (hereinafter 
called, respectively, Phoenix and Oilfields), and James E. 
Mason, all as affected by certain judgments previously recov-
ered by defendant Leming in an action for personal injuries. 
Leming was injured in a highway truck collision on July 10, 
] 951, caused by the negligent driving by Oilfields' employe, 
Mason, of a truck owned by Oilfields. In April, 1955, this 
court affirmed a judgment (in Kern County Superior Court 
CoNTTNF.NTAL CAs. Co. v. PnoENIX CoNSTR. Co. 427 
[ 46 C.2d 42:3; 296 P.2d 801] 
construction equipment. 
into the higlrway contract 
ment between themselves that 
'"''~u'·'-'-" joint ventures. The 
Continental Casualty 
, which had issued an insurance 
Transport Indemnity Company 
, the insurer of Oilfields, ( 
and (6) various other persons as to whom the 
was dismissed before trial. Complaints in intervention 
on behalf on "Underwriters at Ijloyd 'R, London, an 
association" (hereinafter callr'd Ijloyd 's IJon-
rloll ·:. and on behalf of ''Certain Undenuiters at 's 
LoJl(lon" (hereinafter ca1lec1 Pacific Lloyd Lloyd's IJOU-
issued a crrtificate of excess ins1Jrance over the basic 
issued by rrransport 1 to Oilfields, and Pacific 
ha(1 issued certificates of excess insurance over the basic 
Continental to Phoenix. 
extensive oral argument the trial <~unrt concluded 
v•u"'"'""· Phoenix and Mason are eovere(1 nnder the 
and Pacific Hoyd 's policies; Oilfields. but not 
Phoenix or Mason, is covered under the 'l'ransport and Lloyd's 
London policies; that the liability should br 
insurers according to a formnla set out in the 
the appellant herein, contends that its basic 
no coyerage for the liability here 
Phoenix, to Oilfiek1s or to both 
endorsements and exclnsions attached 
had also issued a policy (R o. 46-00~) of excess insurance 
pmvided by the Lloyd's London excess certifieatc. 
128 
that the 
tached to based solely on 
as and not as an 
trial court in the present suit found, among other 
Mason was a employe of Oilfields and a 
and that at the time and 
he >vas ''acting in the scope and course 
as such employee and ' ; Continental ques-
of the evidence to support the finding 
insofar as it refers to Phoenix. Transport (with 's 
, admitting coverage of Oil:fields for any 
chargeable to it which arises from the 
denies that any coverage was extended by Transport to 
Phoenix or to Mason. Transport, Oilfields, Phoenix and 
I1eming all contend that the Continental policy (and Pacific 
Lloyd's excess certificates) extended coverage to Phoenix, Oil-
fields and Mason. 
For reasons which are hereinafter developed we have 
reached the following conclusions: 
1. Insofar as the issues now before us are concerned, Mason, 
as the negligent driver, bears the primary liability to I1eming. 
2. The Transport policy, together with its related excess 
insurance, provides $1,000,000 coverage to Mason as well 
as to Oilfields, an amount more than sufficient to pay the 
Leming award. 
3. The Continental policy, together with its related excess 
certificates, covers neither Mason nor Oilfields. 
4. Hence, there is no need to decide either whether 
the evidence supports the trial court's determination that 
Mason was acting as an employe of Phoenix at the time of 
the accident, or (b) whether either the Continental or the 
rrransport policy (and excess insurance) covers Phoenix. 
5. Result : Transport and Lloyd's London must pay the 
entire award to I1eming. 
[1] ·where a judgment has been rendered against an em-
ployer for damages occasioned by the unauthorized negligent 
act of his employe, the employer may recoup his loss in an 
action against the negligent employe (Pope,ioy v. Hannon 
(1951), i37 Cal.2d 159, 173 [19] [231 P.2d 484]; Bradley v. 
Rosenthal ), 154 Cal. 420, 423 [97 P. 129 Am.St. 
; Johnston· v. City San ·Pernanclo ), 35 Cal. 
2 The liability of Pacific Lloyd's as excess insurer is, of course, depend· 
ent on Continental's liability under the basic policy issued to Phoonix. 
cite Consolidated 
(1941), 45 293 [114 
A.1:r lJJfg. Co. v. Employers' Liab. AssuJ·. 
, 91 Cal.App.2d 129, 132 [204 P.2d 647] ; Em-
Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Pacific Ernp. Ins. Co. , 
188, 192 [227 P.2d 53] ; and Tmders etc. Ins. 
Emp. Ins. Co. (1955), 130 Cal.App.2d 158, 
P.2d 493], as supporting a contrary view; such 
broadly distinguishable on their facts but it would 
extend this opinion and serve no useful purpose to 
discuss and differentiate them as any implications 
contrary to the long established rule above stated 
deemed disapproved. 
Under equitable principles of subrogation the insurer 
employer who has been compelled to pay the judgment 
the employer may recover against the negligent em-
the employe's insurer. (Canadian Indem. Co. v. 
States F.&; 0. Co. (1954, 9 Cir.), 213 li'.2d 659; 
Maryland Cas. Co. v. Employer·s Mtd. Liab. Ins. Co. 
, 208 F.2d 7ill; United Pacific Ins. Co. v. Ohio Cas. Ins. 
9 Cir.), 172 F.2d 836,840 (note 5), 84G-848.) Here, 
established that the negligent act upon which the J_,eming 
is based was the unauthorized act of Mason who, 
be remembered, is not only a judgment debtor to 
but is also a defaulted defendant in this proceeding. 
that if Mason was covered with sufiicient insurance 
the total r,eming judgment, then the insurance cover-
Oilfie1ds and Phoenix becomes immaterial insofar as 
concerns the issues now involved. Consideration will there-
fore be given to whether and to what extent Mason 
1s covered by the two lines of policies, Continental and 
Copies of the insurance policies and excess certificates 
which were in effect at the time of the Leming aecident were 
into evidence by stipulations, not subject to eon-
PHOENIX CoNSTR. Co. C.2d 
evidence was offered in aid 
construction of the is a 
matter of law. (Western Coal & Mining Co. v. Jones (1946), 
27 CaL2d 826-827 P.2d 719, 164 A.L.R. 685] ; see 
also Arenson v. National Atdomobile &; Cas. Ins. Co. (1955), 
81 P.2d .) 
'' commences with 
"Item 1. Name of insured PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION INc.", 
and in I of the printed ''insuring agreements'' 
identifies the protection as Coverages A. B, and C. 4 
thus included in the printed policy form, extends 
coverage to Phoenix for bodily injury liability. An endorse-
ment, numbered R6309202 and hereinafter referred to as 
No. 202, reads as follows: "It is agreed Oil Fields Truck-
is added as an additional insured in connection 
with construction operations conducted as a joint venture with 
the Phoenix Constrcution Company, Inc. 
"It is further agreed that this policy excludes coverage 
for all operations of Oil Fields Trucking Company other than 
construction operations conducted as a joint venture with 
Phoenix Constrcution Company, Inc." 
A second endorsement, numbered R6309208 and hereinafter 
referred to as No. 208, reads: "It is agreed that this policy 
does not to automobiles owned, maintained or used 
by the Oil Fields Trucking Company, even though, they might 
be used in a joint venture operation with other named in-
sureds. ' (Italics added.) 
[ 4a, 5] Although if there is any ambiguity in an insur-
ance policy it must be resolved against the insurer (Arenson v. 
"'rhe policy defines ''automobile'' as ''a land motor vehicle.'' 
'Such coverages read as follows: "Coverage A-Bodily Injury Lia-
bility 
''To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall 
become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury, 
sickness or disease, including death at any time resulting therefrom, 
sustained by any person. 
''Coverage B-Property Damage I1iability-Automobile 
''To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall 
become legally obligated to pay as damages because of injury to or 
destruction of property, including the loss of use thereof, caused by 
accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of any 
automobile. 
''Coverage C-Property Damage Liability-Except Automobile 
"To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall 
become legally obligated to pay as damages because of injury to or 
destruction of property, including the loss of use thereof, caused by 
accident.'' 
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agreements are part of the 
the clear import of the t\YO endorsements liS 
202) Oilfields is added as a second named 
as to construction operations ccmducte<1 
with Phoenix, and (No. 208) that the 
to provides no coverage for) 
the operation of automobiles maintained or used 
even though "used in a joint venture 
oi her named insureds." It follows that the Continental 
(and excess certificates ancillary tb ereio) provided no 
to Mason for the accident to Leming, which resulted 
Mason's negligent operation of a truck owned Oil-
The suggestion of various of the on appeal 
llul' errtain of the other printed policy may be 
1651: '''Where a eon tract is pm'tly written 
or where part of it is written or printed undpr 
of tho parties, and with a special view to their Hllcw,,w,,r, 
tl1c remainder iH eopicd from a form originally 
reference to the particnl:u parties and the 
the written parts control the printed 
al'e original control thoRe whieh nrc a form. And if 
tlw two are absolutely repugnant, the latter muRt be so far disTcgarded.'' 
'Snell provisions, found in paragraph III of the insuring agree-
read as follows so far as here material: 'The unqualified word 
includes the named insured and also includes ... 
A and B, any person while using . . . hired 
the actual use of tho automobile is by the namerl insnred 
permission ... I except that the 1 insurance with respect to 
... other than the named insured docs not (d) 
to any hired automobile, to the owner or any 
of such owner .... '' 
be noted that even if were snecc,sful in their 
that "hired automobile" the Oiliie!llH' truck hon; 
involved, nevertheless it appears that exception (d) would deny coYerage 
to the admitted employe of Oilfields. 
432 PHOENIX CoNSTR. 
to include Mason as an insured must likewise 
of the endorsement 
of vehicles owned 
coverage of the policy. [8] An insurance company has the 
to limit the coverage of a policy issued it and when 
it has done so, the plain language of the limitation must be 
Coit v. Stand.anl Ins. Co. 
28 CaL2d 1, 11; v. lV est Coast 
, 16 CaL2d 23-24 [104 P.2d 
Indem. Co. (1937), 8 CaL2d 476, 478-480 
J09 A.L.R 1162] Security T. & 8. Bank v. New 
Indern .. Co. (1934), 220 Cal. 372, 376-377 [31 P.2d ; 
,John G. a; Co. V. Underwriters at London 
(1948), 84 CaLApp.2d 603, 605 [191 P.2d 124]; Guidici v. 
Pacific Auto. Ins. Co. (1947), 79 CaLApp.2d 128, 134 [179 
P.2d 337]; Boole v. Un·ion lY!aTine Ins. Co., Ltd. (1921), 52 
Cal.App. 207, 209 [198 P. 416] ; American Mut. Liabilz:ty Ins. 
Co. v. Meyer (1940, 3 Cir.), 115 F.2d 807.) 
The next question is whether Mason had insurance cover-
age under the Transport line of policies. It is undisputed 
that at the time of the Leming accident Mason was an employe 
of Oilfields, that the Leming judgment was based upon an 
implied jury finding that in driving Oilfields' truck Mason 
was acting within the scope of his employment at the time 
of the accident, and that the trial court in the present liti-
gation likewise found that he was acting within such scope. 
It is also undisputed that at the time of the accident Mason 
was exercising sole control and direction of the truck. 
It now becomes essential to consider certain provisions 
of the basic Transport policy. Under Coverage Clause (1) 
Transport agrees ''To pay on behalf of the insured all sums 
which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay for 
damages, arising out of the occupation of the named insured, 
as a result of bodily injury ... or death to persons or for 
damage to property of others . . . '' Various endorsements 
attached to the policy state that it "is an Automobile Bodily 
Injury Liability and Property Damage Liability policy" and 
declare that the ''Occupation of the named insured is MoTOR 
CARRIER FOR HmK '' Another endorsement provides that the 
"N arne of the Insured . . . is amended to read : Oilfields 
Trucking Company and P. A. Phoenix and II. E. Phoenix, 
as eo-partners only, jointly and not RevrraHy, doing business 
as Phoenix Brothers Garage and Storage Company [and] 
It is further agreed that the named insured is: CoRPORATION-
~ 
L 
) DEFLN!'l'IOXS 
insnrPr1' :-Jmll mean the 
( L'Jc;1mED The \vord 'immred' 
JHlmerl insured nnr1 also inc1ncleiS 
1 : 1) any , executive oniec:r, nwn-
d i n•et or or stoekhoh1er t1wreof 
trail,•r or semi-trailer and its 
cur~ HE,;r•oxsmrLTTY [,A ws Such insuranee as is afforded 
shall r:ompl,v with the of the motor 
flnanrial rP;.;ponsibility law of any state or province 
shall he applic:ablc, u·ith to any such l'iability 
ont of tlJe ownership, maintenance or use 
automobile r1nring th<~ policy period, to the extent of 
;!;,• ,·uyernge and limits of liability required by such law." 
added.) 
fnrther to be noted (and the significance will later 
that the basic policy prominently dis-
arlvlec seemingly applicable to the person directly in 
of, operating, or" managing" the motor vehicle. Under 
"\VnA•r 'l'o Do TN CAsE OF AccmENT" it ad-
" Stop, reiH1er ai.d. Place flags, flares, or post 
warn other traffic·-··aYoid other accidents. Get 
and addresses of witnesses. If no eye witnesses, obtain 
and addresses of first persons to arrive. Get 1 icense 
numbers of vehicles if persons refuse names. Heport acci-
in\·olving injury (no matter how slight) immediately 
telrphone to our nearest claim office. Order photographs in 
I serious aceidents; the Exchange will asr<nme the cost. Be 
eom·teons-GooD CoNDUCT lh:r"Ps. Draw rough diagram of 
s<o"lh~ of aceident showing position of vehicles or Rkidmarks; 
olf distances. 'l'his will assist in giving an aecuratc 
Protect your equipment or cargo from further dam-
theft." Under the heading "\VnAT NoT 'l'o Do IN 
OF' AcciDEK'r" it cautions: "Do not admit n•sponsi-
; let the J~xehangc determine if you are legally rcspon-
Do HOt agree to pay anything, except for immediate 
Aid treatment. In accidents iuvolving death, do not talk 
st atenwnt;; mttil yo11 arP represcnte(l by an at! orney 
lmw this rigl1t unrllor the law. Don't arg1te n•sponsi-
434 CoNTINENTAL CAs. Co. v. PHOENIX CoNsTR. Co. [ 46 C.2d 
bility for the accident. Don't make any verbal statements 
at the scene of accident regarding the accident. Statements 
you make may be used as evidence against you. Do NoT SIGN 
ANYTHING, except for your insurance Be sure 
to identify the insurance investigator as representing yo~tr 
company, not someone else." (Italics added.) 
At the times concerned Oilfields, by reason of its 
was to the Highway Carriers Act 
223) and was required § ''to procure, and continue in 
effect during the life of the permit [issued by the Public 
Utilities Commission and without which Oilfields' operations 
would be unlawful], adequate protection ... against liabil-
ity imposed by law ... for the payment of damages for 
personal bodily injuries ... " Section 6 of the Highway 
Carriers Act further enacts that ''The protection required 
under section 5 shall be evidenced by the deposit with the 
Railroad [now Public Utilities] Commission, covering each 
vehicle used or to be used under the permit applied for, of 
a policy of public liability and property damage insurance 
. . . or of a bond of a surety company . . . or of a personal 
bond ... " 
At the times concerned Oilfields was also subject to Cali-
fornia's general automobile financial responsibility law. That 
law is found in sections 410 through 423.1 of the Vehicle Code. 
(See Escobedo v. State (1950), 35 Cal.2d 870, 878 [222 P.2d 
1] .) Sections 410-418.5, which comprise chapter 2, cover 
the matter of establishing responsibility after an accident and 
an unpaid judgment, while sections 419-423.1, which comprise 
chapter 3, provide for such a showing after the accident and 
before any judgment, all directly intended for the benefit of 
dr·ivers and owners of motor vehicles as a means of forestalling 
suspension of the license of the driver and of the registration 
of the vehicle or vehicles, and, more fundamentally, designed 
to give monetary protection to that ever changing and tragi-
cally large group of persons who while lawfully using the 
highways themselves suffer grave injury through the negli-
gent use of those highways by others. [9] Such a law is 
remedial in nature and in the public interest is to be liberally 
construed to the end of fostering its objectives. (See Wheeler 
v. O'Connell (1937), 297 Mass. 549 [9 N.E.2d 544, 111 A.L.R. 
1038, 1041] .) As said by Mr. Justice Heydenfeldt for this 
court long ago, and still the law, "The rule of law in the 
construction of remedial statutes requires great liberality, 
and wherever the meaning is doubtful, it must be so construed 
CAs. Co. v. PHOENIX CoNSTR. Co. 435 
423; 296 P.2d 801] 
(While v. Ann 
. 462. 470 [65 ~1\.m.Dec. see also Cullerton v. 
), 22 CaL 96, 98; Cormcmis v. Gcnella (1863), 22 
]25; Davis v. Hearst (1911), 160 Cal. 143, 188 [116 
2, the 
with his 
whose truck was operated Mason) 
of the registration of the vehicle (V ch. 
subd. ; Sheehan v. Division Motor Vehicles 
, 140 Cal.App. 200, 205 P.2d 359]) unless he files 
affidavit that at the time of the accident ... he 
that the insurer is liable to pay such judgment, 
reason, if known, 1vhy such insurance company has 
sneh judgment. He shall also file the original 
of insurance or a certified copy thereof, if available,'' 
his sho·wing is satisfactory his registration certificate 
uot be su:spended. (Veh. Code, § 411.5.) Under section 
the procedure is made applicable to successive accidents 
jucigments. 
Seetion 415 is entitled "Requisites of Motor V chicle Lia-
Policy," and provides: "(a) A 'motor vehicle liability 
, ' as used in th·is code means a policy of liability insur-
. . . to or for the benefit of the person named therein as 
which policy shall meet the following requirements: 
" 1) Such policy shall designate by explicit description or 
reference all motor vehicles with respect to 
coverage is thereby intended to be granted. 
Such policy shall insure the person named therein 
any other person [here, l\Iason] using or responsible for 
of said motor vehicle or rnotor vehicles w·ith the 
1 xpress or implied permission of said assured. 
'' ) Such policy shall insure every said person on account 
the . . . operation of every motor vehicle therein covered 
. . against loss from the liability imposed by law arising 
such ... operation to the extent ... with respect 
each such motor vehicle, of five thousand dollars ( $5,000) 
bodily injury to or death of each person as a result of 
one accident and, subject to said limit as to one person, 
amount of ten thousand dollars ($10,000) for bodily in-
to or death of all persons as a result of any one acci-
dent ... 
PHoENIX CoNSTR. Co. 
in 
or contain any or 
conflict with the of this code 
to law. . " (Italics added.) 
[10] although the financial 
does not in so many words make mandatory the of 
a liability insurance policy prior to the first accident and 
the Highway Carriers Act does. an 
employer who is a highway as a practical matter in 
the ordinary course of business, in order to protect against 
the possibility of suspension in case of a judgment against 
himself and his employe, must have in force a policy complying 
with the requisites of section 415. (See Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 1963, subds. 4, 20.) Here, of course, it is not disputed that 
the Transport liability insurance policy was executed; the 
only dispute with which we are seriously concerned is whether 
and to what extent the policy covered Mason in his operation 
of Oilfields' truck at the time of the Leming accident. 
It is the position of Transport (among other contentions) 
that California's financial responsibility laws do not require 
that Mason's liability be covered, that section 415 of the 
Vehicle Code has no application to the present ease, and that 
in order to avoid the forfeiture or suspension provisions of 
the law by evidence of insurance it is not necessary for the 
owner of a motor vehicle to show that the personal liability 
of his employe is insured. \Ve have given careful considera-
tion to all of Transport's arguments. 7 It is, however, our 
conclusion reached in the light of all pertinent provisions of 
7We note in this connection that under the provisions of chapter 3 
(Veh. Code, ~§ 419-423.1), as they existed on the date of the accident 
here involved (July 10, 1951), it is made the duty of the driver, and in 
case the driver was permissively operating ''a motor vehicle owned, 
operated or leased by" his employer then it is the duty of the employer 
rather than of the driver ( § 419), to report to the department of motor 
vehicles any accident which resulted in personal injury or death; except 
that the employer need not make such a I"eport if the vehicle involved 
in the accident ''is owned or operated by any person or corporation who 
has filed with the department a certificate of an insurance carrier or 
bonding company that there is in effect a policy or bond meeting the 
requirements of Section 422.6 and when such insurance policy or bond 
was in full force and effect in respect to .such vehicle at the time of the 
accident.'' Unless a driver can meet the pre-accident security provisions 
laid down in chapter 3, he is required to deposit security or suffer 
suspension of driving privileges in this state, except that if he was per· 
missively driving his employer's motor vehicle then the suspension pro-
visions do not apply to the driver but instead do apply to the employer; 
unless the employer can meet the pre-accident security provisions 
(i.e., insurance policy, or bond) in such case, he is required to deposit 
security or suffer the suspension of ''registration of all vehicles not 
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, that coverage 
Oilfields' truck and that 
as to 
in immranee law that any 
an msnranee is to be resolved 
rcnson Y. National A11io. &; Cas. Ins. Co. 
45 Ca1.2d fl:=l; Coit v. Standard 
(194tl), swpm, 28 Cal.2d 1, 3; 5 Am.,Tnr. 790, 
Tf smnantieally permissible, the eontract will 
sneh (·onstrtieiion as will fairly achieve its object 
to the insured for the losses to which 
ranee relates. (Fageol1'. & C. Co. v. Pac1:jie Indem. 
) , 18 CaL2d 748, 751 1117 P.2d .) [12] If 
uses language which is uncertain any reasonable 
will be rrso1 ved against it if the doubt relates to 
r.r faet of eovcragc, whether as to pi•ri1 insured against 
T. & C. Co. v. Pacific Indem. Co. (1941), 18 Cal.2d 
746-747 116, 171 r117 P.2cl6611; Ocran etc. Corp., Ltd. v. 
/)l(luslrial Lice. Cmn. (1924), 194 Cal. 127, 132 r228 P. 1]; 
Y. United Ins. Co. (1952), 113 Cal.App.2d 493 [248 
H8]; Pendell v. Westland Life Ins. Co. (1950), 95 Cal. 
766, 770 [214 P.2d 392] ; see also Christoffer v. IIart-
A .. cc. etc. Co. (1954), 123 Cal.App.2d Supp. 979 [267 
) , the amount of liability (Hobson v. Mutual Benefit 
A. Assn. ( 1930), 99 Cal.App.2d 330, 333 et seq. [221 
; see also N arve1· v. Caliform:a State Life Ins. Co. 
, 211 CaL 176, 180 et seq. [294 P. 3931) or the person 
persons protected (Olson v. Standard Marine Ins. Co. 
i, lOD Ca1.App.2d 130, 135 [1, 5] [240 P.2d 379]; see 
insurance ... owned, OJWratprl or l0nsed l,y him ... '' 
declares that exemption from the requirements of post· 
sccnrity following an nccident may be esta hlishod by satisfactory 
to the department (a) that tho owner had ''in effect with resped 
tho driYcr or the motor n•hicle inYolved in the accident ..• an auto-
or bond ... [which] shall meet the requirements 
that the driver, if not the ow11er, had in effect 
his own driving; " (c) That such liability 
arise from tho operation of the motor vehiele involved 
neeidont in the ;judgmrmt of the depnrtment covered by some 
of: liability insuran<~l' or homl whid1 eomplies with the rcqnirr-
forth under Seetion .J:22.G.'' 
4~:l.H sets forth enrtnin qualifieations of the insnranee com-
tmd Tequirm policy limits of not less than ;iffl,OOO for injury or 
of one person in any one areid('nt, $10,000 for two or more 
persons in the same accident, and .$1,000 property damage. 
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also Island v. Fireman's lhtnd Indem. Co. ( ' 30 
541, 548 [184 P.2d 153, 173 A.L.R 896] ; 
can Indern. Co. (1932), 127 Cal.App. 202 [15 P.2d 
language ·will be understood in its most inclusive 
the benefit of the insured. [13a] Here we have the 
v. Ameri-
), the 
for 
explicit provision of section 415 of the V ehiclc Code that ''A 
'motor vehicle liability policy,' as used in this code means a 
policy ... , which policy shall meet the 
ments: .. (2) Such poliey shall insure the person named 
therein and any other person using or responsible for the 
use of said motor vehiele . . . with the . . . of 
said assured," and coupled with that are the provisions of the 
Highway Carriers Act and the language of the policy, some 
of it as already emphasized being apparently directed pri-
marily to the driver of the vehicle, admonishing him as to his 
duties upon the happening of an aceident, and in another 
plaee declaring that the coverage provided ''shall comply with 
the provisions of the motor vehicle financial responsibility 
law ... which shall be applicable with respect to any sttch 
liability arising out of the existence ... or use of any auto-
mobile ... to the extent of the eoverage and limits of lia-
bility required by such law." (Italics added.) That language 
cannot properly be construed to mean minimum coverage or 
minimum limits; rather, it must be interpreted as providing 
full or maximum coverage in both aspeets insofar as encom-
passed by the law and not exceeding the clear limitations of 
the contraet. 
[14] We have hereinabove noted the contract provision 
expressly stating that "The unqualified word 'insured' in-
eludes the named insured and also as respeets Coverage 
Clause 1 [the coverage clause here involved] ... any part-
ner, executive officer, managing employee, director or stoek-
holdcr thereof while acting within the seope of his duties 
as sueh ... " Obviously the term "managing employee" 
is used for generic inelusion. 55 Corpus ,Juris Secundum, page 
2, tells us that "managing" means "To have under control 
and c1ireetion; to eontrol and direct; ... to guide.'' Web-
ster's New International Dictionary gives the same meanings. 
\Ve need not g·o farther. It is undisputed that Mason at the 
time of the r_,eming accident was Oilfields' employe and that 
he had Oilfields' truck under his control and direction; he 
was guiding it and he was acting within the scope of his 
duties. In respect to the several tons of equipment entrusted 
to him he was Oilfields' sole managing employe. The very 
CoNTIKEN'l'AL CAs. Co. v. PHOENIX CoNSTR. Co. 439 
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signification. 'l'his argument, however, for rea-
in the authorities already cited, must be resolved 
the insurer and in favor of coverage. We must there-
as already indicated, that the Transport policy 
Mason in his operation, direction and control of the 
truck here involved. 
·with respect to the extent or limits of coverage of 
it has already been noted that condition ( 6) of the 
'l'ransport policy states, ''to the extent of the . . . limits 
required by such law" and that such language 
its full and inclusive, as opposed to a restrictive, 
The primary Transport policy, Number 46-001, is 
limited to $5,000 for injury or death of one person and 
for two or more persons injured or killed in any one 
accident. Lloyd's London excess certificate 46-C3-32 provides 
insurance in the amount of $40,000 excess over $10,000 
the hazards and perils of Comprehensive Bodily 
Property Damage and Cargo Liability Coverage as 
under policies issued by the Transport Indemnity 
... to Oilfields Trucking Company, et al. and 
persons . . . named as insureds under said policies, 
hereinafter called the Assured.'' The certificate further 
declares that "It is the intention of the parties that under 
the Assured is to be indemnified up to $40,000.00 
aforesaid, against all liability in excess of the liability 
of Primary Insurer under its policies. 
It is agreed that this Policy is subject to the same War-
Terms and Conditions (except as regards . . . the 
and limit of Liability ... ) as are contained in, or 
may be added to said Policy of the Primary Insurer.'' 
Inasmuch as Mason was covered by the primary Transport 
(No. 46-001, with limits of $5,000 and $10,000), the 
's London certificate ( 46-C3-32) thus increases his cover-
the amount of $40,000. 
Transport policy 46-002 furnishes additional excess cover-
age "over $50,000.00" in an amount of $950,000. The "spe-
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to the same terms and con. 
ditions the amount and limit of lia~ 
bility . as are contained or as may be added to the 
primary policy issued by . . 'rransport ... " Thus, Ma-
son's coverage was increased this policy to an aggregate 
total of one million dollars, obviously sufficient to meet the 
I1eming judgment of less than a of a million. 
Inasmuch as the Transport line of policies did, and the 
Continental line did not, afford personal coverage to Mason, 
the driver upon whom ultimate responsibility for the Leming 
judgment otherwisl:) devolves, it follows that no further con-
troversy remains to be decided as between the other parties 
to this litigation. It may further be noted that placing the 
responsibility for the insurance coverage squarely upon the 
carriers for Mason and for his employer, the owner of the 
truck he was driving, not only accords with the purposes and 
intents of the policy provisions and of the financial re~ 
sponsibility law, but appears also to accomplish justice as 
among all the parties involved in this declaratory suit. 
[15] One final matter remains for mention. Plaintiff-
appellant, Continental, has filed in this court an application 
for leave to produce additional evidence (see rule 23, subd. 
(b), Rules on .Appeal) which it avers will show that full pay-
ment of the Leming judgment has been made by or on behalf 
of Phoenix, Oilfields, and Transport; that full satisfaction of 
such judgment has been entered of record; and that by reason 
of such facts and upon various asserted legal principles any 
theory for contribution by Continental has become unenforce-
able. In view of our conclusions as stated hereinabove, no 
useful purpose would be served in receiving such evidence, 
and the application to produce the same will be denied. 
[16] Because there will be no factual issues to be deter-
mined after a reversal of the judgment, since the errors of the 
trial court were of law only, it is appropriate to reverse with 
directions. (Code Civ. Proc., § 53; Estate of Davis ( 1936), 
8 Cal.2d 11, 12 [62 P.2d 582, 63 P.2d 827]; Wixom v. Davis 
(1926), 198 Cal. 641, 645 [246 P. 1041]; Stauter v. Carithers 
(1921), 185 Cal. 160, 164 [196 P. 37].) 8 
8The fact that the Pacific Lloyd's group (providers of the excess 
certificates over the basic Continental policy issued to Phoenix) did not 
appeal does not preclude reversal as to them, for the phase of the 
judgment relating to their alleged liability is so inextricably interwoven 
c 
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agree msuranr·.e \:overed Mason and 
but do not agree that the Continent nl jn;;;urnm·P 
not cover Oilfields and Mason. The 
hold;;; that Mason and Oilficlds are not eoverer1 by Continental 
of an endorsement on the Continental >Yhieh 
it says excludes the operation of automobiles. 
Oilfields and Phoenix ·were engaged in a joint vcntnn:. 
cu,cuc.:u issued a policy to Phoenix as the named insnrer1. 
policy was mainly concerned 1vith coyer age of liability 
out of the operation of automobiles. At the time the 
was issued the endorsements here involved ;,vcre at· 
taehed. Both endorsements 202 and 208 were a(lded at the 
time, one following the other in attachment to thr polic•.;· 
and both were typewritten. They read (202): "It i,; agreed 
Oil Pields Trucking Company is mlded as an ad(litional in. 
in connection with construction operations eondncted 
as joint venture with the Phoenix Constrnction Compnny, 
Tnc. 
"It is further agreed that this policy excludes rovcrag·r 
a1l operations of Oil Pields Trucking Company other than 
construction operations conducted as a joint venture with 
Phoenix Construction Com pan:."." And 208 rea(l: "lt is 
that this policy does not apply to automobiles owned, 
maintained or used by the Oil Fields Trneking Company, 
even though, they might be used in a joint venture operation 
othrr namrd insnrerls. '' Thesr en(1orsrnwnts mnst be 
together for they deal ·with thr same Tnasmm::h 
arc both t.ypewriitcn the~· an• on an rq11al footing 
Ollf' 1lo''" not eontrol ov1.~r tlw other. HrlW<' tlw rnle, illai 
.ilJdg·nleHi. th:tt. ;1 ('Ompi('t~· reYt't':-i;d is llt'('f'S~:1 
H!af'llf'! Y. maehe (1 n:;n' C:tl.:2<1 1. 
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upon 
makes Oilfields a named insured 
with Phoenix insofar as the two are 
joint venture. Hence Oilfields is as covered as 
that to the same extent as if it had been named 
Phoenix in the , the main purpose of was to 
cover automobile Then comes endorsement 208. 
It is to that endorsement to exclude opera-
tion of trucks owned Oilfields and used in the ven-
ture as is done the may be in-
terpreted to be in direct conflict with 202 on the basis that 
202 extends coverage to Oilfields as an insured and then 208 
purports to take that coverage away. So the rule 
of construction against the insurer would that 208 
be ignored. 
There is another wholly reasonable construction which 
limits 208 to joint ventures between Oilfields and Phoenix and 
others who might be insureds. It will be recalled that in 
making Oilfields an insured, 202 expressly mentions and 
makes it such an insured in joint venture construction opera-
tions between Oilfields and Phoenix by that name. Endorse-
ment 208 then says that, as to automobile operations by Oil-
fields, the policy does not extend even though they might be 
used in a joint venture with other insureds. It is reasonable 
to interpret "even though" as "if" (May v. J1issour·i Pac. 
R. Co., 143 Ark. 75 [219 S.W. 756, ; Webster's New 
Inter. Diet. (2d ed.), pp. 885, 77) and "other" insured as 
"different from that which has been specified" (Robinson 
v. First Nat. Life Ins. Co., (La.App.) 10 So.2d 249, 251; 
In re Nelson's Estate, 152 Misc. 245 [273 N.Y.Supp. 268]; 
'Webster's New Inter. Diet. (2d ec1.), p. 1729). Endorsement 
208 then reads that the policy does not cover automobiles 
owned by Oilfields if they are used in joint venture opera-
tions with different insureds. We already have a joint ven-
ture expressly named in 202. A different one then would 
be a venture between Oilfields and some insured other than 
Phoenix. Hence where, as here, the liability arose out of 
the Phoenix-Oilfields joint venture and none 208 is not 
applicable. 
Oilfielcls being a named insured, then Mason, its employee, 
the driver of the truck is clearly covered because the policy 
states that the insured includes "any person while using an 
owned automobile'' if the use is by the insured ''or with 
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pur-
most 
. NMth American Ace. Ins. 
P. 26 khR. 1231; Bayley v. Em-
125 Cal. 345, 352 P. 7].) The in-
bound to use such language as to make the exceptions 
of the contract clear to the ordinary mind; 
fails to do so, any uncertainty or reasonable 
resolYed against it. (Pacific etc. Co. v. Wil-
158 Cal. 367, 370 [111 P. 41.)" (Emphasis 
accordance with that rule, endorsement 208, being sus-
the construction that it does not take away the 
of the judg-ment recovered by Leming against 
Oilfields and Phoenix within the limits of their re-
of respondents Oilfields 'rrucking Co., Trans-
and Underwriters at I,loyd 's I1ondon 
·was dtmied May 29, 1~);')6. Shenk, J., and 
were of the opinion that the petition should be 
